Ponente
Sr.
Weilong Wang
(University of Vigo)
Descripción
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) is proposed to remove all the detection side-channels in quantum communication systems. In recent years, MDI-QKD has been proven to be secure with certain assumptions and become a significant step toward the practicality of QKD systems. However, the assumption that there is no information leakage from the security zones of the legitimate parties seems very difficult to be guaranteed in practice. In this work we relax this assumption by proposing a general formalism to prove the security of MDI-QKD in the presence of information leakage. Particularly, we analyze a specific Trojan-Horse attack on the intensity modulator and phase modulator and the secure key rates under different amounts of information leakage are calculated in several practical cases. Our work provides an essential reference for experimentalists to ensure the security when implementing MDI-QKD protocols in the presence of information leakage.
Autor primario
Sr.
Weilong Wang
(University of Vigo)
Coautor
Sr.
Marcos Curty
(University of Vigo)